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Herberg: D.W.I. Suspects Do Not Have Right to Consult with Counsel before

CASENOTE

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Right to Counsel-D.W.I.
Suspects Do Not Have Right To Consult With Counsel
Before Intoxilyzer Test Under Texas Constitution
Because Test Is Not A "Critical Stage"
In Proceedings.
Forte v. State,

759 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
While driving down a public street on January 10, 1984, Edward Earle
Forte ran a stop sign, struck another vehicle, and eventually came to rest in
a ditch after losing control of his car.' The officer dispatched to the scene of
the accident, Lt. Crawford, found Forte apparently inebriated and arrested
him for suspicion of driving while intoxicated (D.W.I.).2 Forte was taken to
jail and informed of his Miranda rights.3 Crawford asked Forte to take an
intoxilyzer test and informed him of the penalties4 for refusing to do so.5
Forte, then, requested an attorney.6 Crawford refused Forte's request and

1. Forte v. State, 707 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
2. Id. at 90. Forte was unable to stand, speaking with a slur, and Crawford smelled
alcohol on his breath. Id. The zipper on Forte's pants was open and there was a dark spot in
the crotch area. Id. In Forte's car, Crawford saw a partially empty whiskey bottle and an
empty wine bottle. Id.
3. Id. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)(police must inform
accused of constitutional rights before beginning interrogation).
4. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2(b)(Vernon Supp. 1989). In pertinent
part, the statute provides that a refusal to take the test results in the automatic suspension of
the suspect's driving permit. Id. The statute further provides that the refusal to take the test
may be admissible at trial. Id.
5. See Forte v. State, 707 S.W.2d 89, 90-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)(en banc). In all,
Forte was given both his Miranda and "breath test" warnings three times. Id. at 91. These
multiple warnings resulted from the movement of Forte to another jail in order to administer
the intoxilyzer test. Id.
6. Forte, 707 S.W.2d at 91. It was not until the third set of warnings were given that Forte
requested an attorney. Id.
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Forte subsequently provided a sample of his breath for analysis.' Forte was
charged with driving while intoxicated after the intoxilyzer unit registered a
blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent.8 Forte was convicted at trial, but the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed his conviction.9 The Fort Worth
court held that evidence of the intoxilyzer test results should not have been
admitted at trial because the police denied Forte his limited right to counsel
under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.'° The Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed in part," reversed in part,' 2 and remanded to
the court of appeals for consideration of whether Forte's right to counsel had
been denied under state law. 13 On remand, the court of appeals held that the
Texas Constitution did not provide the appellant with the right to consult
counsel prior to the administration of an intoxilyzer test.14 The Court of
Criminal Appeals granted Forte's petition for discretionary review to decide
whether article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution provided a right to
consult with counsel before the administration of an intoxilyzer test.' 5

7. Id.
8. Id. For a detailed explanation of how an intoxilyzer unit operates, see, TRICHTER &
LEWIS, TEXAS DRUNK DRIVING LAW 29-55 (vol. 1 1988); see also State v. Tiernan, 206
N.W.2d 898, 900-01 (Iowa 1973)(description of intoxilyzer unit). TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 67011-5, § 3(4)(A),(B) states that a person is legally intoxicated when the blood
alcohol concentration is or exceeds 0.10% or when physical impairment is caused by alcohol
or a controlled substance.
9. Forte v. State, 686 S.W.2d 744, 756 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985), aff'd in part,rev'd
in part, 707 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
10. Forte v. State, 686 S.W.2d 744, 756 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 707 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Tex. Crim App. 1986). Forte raised eight grounds of error on appeal.
Id. at 745. The court overruled all of them except his claim of denial of his right to counsel.
Id. at 748, 751, 752, 756.
11. Forte v. State, 707 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (D.W.I. statute held constitutional under sixth amendment).
12. Id. The court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach until
formal adversary judicial proceedings have commenced against the defendant. Id. at 91; see
also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986)(right to counsel first attaches at time of
formal charging); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984)(initiation of criminal
proceedings marks point at which right to counsel attaches); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
688 (1972)(plurality opinion)(right to counsel attaches when adversary judicial proceedings
initiated against accused).
13. Forte v. State, 707 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Forte claimed that article
I, sections 3, 10, & 19 of the Texas Constitution and articles 1.04, 1.05, and 38.23 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure provided him with the right to counsel before taking the intoxilyzer test. Id. at 92.
14. Forte v. State, 722 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth), aff'd, 759 S.W.2d 128,
139 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The court of appeals narrowed the issue solely to Forte's right to
counsel under article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution and eliminated all other state law
claims. Id.
15. Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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Held-Affirmed.' 6 D.W.I. suspects do not have a right to consult with
counsel before an intoxilyzer test under the Texas Constitution because the
test is not a "critical stage" in the proceedings.7
The guarantee of the right to counsel as provided by the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution ensures that the defendant will have effective assistance of counsel at his trial. 8 In order for the accused to have a fair
trial, the assistance of counsel is necessary at certain critical pretrial
events.' 9 Once an indictment is issued, the right to counsel attaches.2"
However, the right to counsel at pre-indictment proceedings is determined
by whether the proceeding is deemed to be a "critical stage."' 2' A "critical
stage" occurs when the state has committed itself to prosecute the defendant, and the proceeding is such that the accused would be unfairly
16. Id. at 139.
17. Id.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence." Id.; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)(counsel required at any "critical stage" where accused's right to fair trial might be diminished). The
United States Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright established the right to counsel for
indigent defendants in state criminal trials. 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963). Gideon declared that the
accused required the "guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against him."
Id. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)). In Powell, the Court stated
that counsel was necessary at "the most critical period of the proceedings ... from the time of
their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important." Powell, 287 U.S. at 57.
19. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970)(preliminary hearing); White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963)(hearing before magistrate to enter any plea); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961)(pretrial arraignment).
20. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964)(post-indictment interrogations without counsel violate sixth amendment). In Massiah, a defendant awaiting trial made
incriminating statements to a police informant who was wearing a transmitting device thus
allowing police to intercept the conversation. Id. at 203. The Supreme Court held that the
actions of the informant and police constituted an interrogation which was impermissible
when an indictment had issued, and counsel was not present. Id. at 206.
21. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)(post-indictment lineup deemed a
"critical stage"). The Supreme Court recognized the complex and sophisticated nature of
modern law enforcement and stated, "[Tioday's law enforcement machinery involves critical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results
might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial to a mere formality." Id. at 224.
However, not all pretrial events are considered to be critical. Compare Buchanan v. Kentucky,
U.S. _ _, 107 S. Ct. 2906, 2919, 97 L. Ed.2d 336, 356 (1987)(psychiatric interviews
conducted pursuant to joint motion by defendant's counsel and the prosecution not critical
stage) with Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470-71 (1981)(court ordered psychiatric examination conducted without presence of counsel held to be critical stage). Other pretrial proceedings have been ruled to be non-critical. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321
(1973)(photographic lineup not critical stage); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972)(preindictment lineup not critical stage); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765-66 (1966)(taking blood sample by police over objection of accused not violative of sixth amendment).
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prejudiced at trial if denied counsel.2 2 Therefore, if the two prerequisites of
certain prosecution and prejudice to trial rights have been met, federal law
requires that the accused receive counsel.23
Although the United States Constitution provides the minimum protection afforded to an individual, the states are free to further protect individual
rights within their body of state law. 24 Article I, section 10 of the Texas

22. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). In United States v. Wade, the Supreme
Court left open the question of whether investigatory stages could be considered a critical stage
which necessitated counsel for the accused. See Note, CriminalProcedure-Right to Counsel-Miranda Warnings Sufficient to Inform Defendant of Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
for Postindictment Interrogations,20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 473, 476-77 (1989). In Kirby, the Court
foreclosed the possibility that investigations are critical stages when it ruled that the right to
counsel does not attach until it is clear that the accused will be prosecuted. See Kirby, 406 U.S.
at 688. The Court reasoned that it is only when "criminal prosecutions" have been initiated
that the defendant must confront the adversarial judicial system. Id. To meet that confrontation, the defendant must have counsel. Id. at 689-90. Thus, Kirby established a "bright line
rule" to determine when the right attaches. Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1967)(explaining history of
sixth amendment cases).
The case of Coleman v. Alabama provided the Supreme Court with the vehicle to further set
boundaries of a critical stage. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970). In Coleman,
a preliminary hearing was held solely to determine whether sufficient evidence existed to warrant the presentation of the evidence to the grand jury and to fix bail if the offense was one
which so permitted. Id. Any testimony produced at the hearing was inadmissible against the
accused. Id. The Supreme Court held that the presence of counsel was required to "protect
the indigent accused against an erroneous or improper prosecution." Id. The Court gave four
reasons in support of its holding. Id. at 9. First, counsel's ability to effectively examine and
cross-examine witnesses could illuminate fatal defects in the prosecution's case which could
lead the magistrate to release the accused. Second, an attorney may also gather testimony
which could be used to impeach witnesses or be put forward at trial in the event a witness fails
to appear. Third, counsel can begin discovery to prepare a proper defense. Id. Finally, counsel can present effective arguments at the preliminary hearing concerning the propriety of bail
or a psychiatric examination for the accused. Id.
The Supreme Court has also held that entering a plea at a preliminary hearing requires the
assistance of counsel. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963). In White, the defendant at a
preliminary hearing before a magistrate entered a guilty plea without the aid of counsel. Id.
Upon the appointment of counsel, the defendant changed his plea to "not guilty by reason of
insanity." At trial the state entered into evidence the original plea of "guilty" and the defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court stated, "Only the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently." Id.
(quoting Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961)).
23. See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90 (right to counsel attaches when prosecution is certain);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)(right to counsel attaches when necessary to
prevent prejudice to trial rights of accused).
24. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975)(states free to provide greater protections against police actions than those required by federal constitution); Lucas v. United
States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988)(Texas Constitution provides right of access to courts
not found in federal Constitution). The Texas Supreme Court noted that the Texas Constitution contains an "open courts" guarantee which dates to the founding of the republic and to

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol21/iss1/9

4

Herberg: D.W.I. Suspects Do Not Have Right to Consult with Counsel before

1989]

CASENOTE

Constitution provides, in part, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused...
shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both." 25 Since
the founding of the Texas Republic in 1836, the citizens of Texas have adhered to the concept of ordered liberty unrestrained by governmental interference. 2 6 Article I, section 10 contains a panoply of rights intended to
protect the accused including the right to confront witnesses, the right to a
jury trial, and the right to counsel.2 7 The unique history of Texas has fostered the public's desire to strongly protect the rights of the criminally accused.2" The Texas Legislature further solidified the rights of its citizens by

the Magna Carta. Id. at 690. In expounding on the protections of the Texas Constitution, the
Texas Supreme Court has stated:
State constitutions can and often do provide additional rights for their citizens. The federal constitution sets the floor for individual rights; state constitutions establish the ceiling. Recently, state courts have not hesitated to look to their own constitutions to protect
individual rights. This court has been in the mainstream of this movement.
LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986); see also Gillett v. State, 588 S.W.2d 361,
367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)(Roberts, J., dissenting)(states may grant greater protections than
federal constitution); Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)(federal Constitution only sets minimum safeguards for individual rights and when interpreting Texas Constitution courts must follow own interpretation).
25. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. The right to counsel has been embodied in all Texas Constitutions. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 interp. commentary (Vernon 1984).
26. See J. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY AND LITIGA-

MANUAL 19 (1987)(framers of Texas Constitution had anti-government sentiments).
27. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 (listing rights of accused). The framers of the first Texas
Constitution incorporated into a single paragraph all of the protections granted to the accused.
See TEX. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. 6 (1836). The present constitution reflects
those same rights in much the same form. Compare TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 (listing rights of
accused) with TEX. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. 6 (1836)(rights of accused listed
in paragraph form).
28. See TEX. CONST. PREAMBLE, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984)(Mexico deprived
Texas of basic rights). Mexico had promised Texas a separate state constitution which was
never granted. Id. Instead, Texans were governed by laws written in Spanish and were denied
even the basic right to a jury trial. Id. After its period of independent self-rule and eventual
statehood, Texas was subjected to the devastation of the Civil War and the abusive policies of
the Reconstruction. Id. Each of these events contributed to the strong commitment to individual liberty. See Ponton, Sources of Liberty in the Texas Bill of Rights, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J.
93, 94, 104 (1988)(Texas Bill of Rights unique from others because of unique Texas experience); see also Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(right of confrontation guaranteed since founding of republic); Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983)(Texas has more protective constitutional provisions than federal constitution);
Milton v. State, 549 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)(state statute authorizing warrantless arrest more restrictive on police officers than federal constitution); Texas Nat'l Guard
Armory Bd. v. McGraw, 132 Tex. 613, 624, 126 S.W.2d 627, 634 (1939)(Texas Constitution to
be liberally construed); Terrell v. Middleton, 187 S.W. 367, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1916)(Texas Constitution should be liberally construed as opposed to strict interpretation of
federal Constitution), writ r.ef'd per curiam, 191 S.W. 1138, 1150 (1917); Mellinger v. City of
TION
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enacting a specific statute to prevent the denial of counsel to the accused. 29
Likewise, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has adamantly guarded this

right."

However, with the advent of the automobile, the desire to protect

individual rights had to be balanced against the responsibility of protecting

Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 43, 3 S.W. 249, 252 (1 887)(citizens of Texas given greater protections in
state constitution than federal constitution).
Texas preceded the United States Supreme Court when it imposed greater restrictions on
police seeking to obtain a search warrant. See Chapin v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 477, 481-84,
296 S.W. 1095, 1097-99 (1927)(probable cause may not be based on mere conclusions). The
decision in Chapin defining the requirements of probable cause came thirty years before the
United States Supreme Court reached the same result when defining probable cause under the
federal constitution. See Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 172 n. II (Tex. Crim. App.
1988)(Clinton, J., dissenting).
29. See TEX. PENAL CODE 1911, art. 1046 (Complete Texas Statutes-Vernon,
1920)(White's Ann. P.C. art. 625). The statute read as follows:
If any officer or other person having the custody of a prisoner in this state shall willfully
prevent such prisoner from consulting or communicating with counsel, or from obtaining
the advice or services of counsel in the protection or prosecution of his legal rights, he
shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not less than six months, and by fine
not exceeding one thousand dollars.
Id; see also Law of Nov. 15, 1864, ch. 19, § 1, 1864 Tex. Gen. Laws 15 (Second Extra Session),
5 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 821 (1898). This statute, which grants extra protections to the
accused, was enacted while Texas was involved in the Civil War. Id. The protections of the
statute are now embodied in Penal Code section 39.02 which prohibits official oppression.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.02 (Vernon 1974)(public servant commits crime if knowing
conduct to be unlawful, he deprives another of a right); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 39.021 (Vernon 1989)(prohibiting violation of civil rights of prisoner).
30. See Hamilton v. State, 68 Tex. Crim. 419, 427, 153 S.W. 331, 336 (1913)(Texas constitution guarantees that accused has right to consult with counsel). In Hamilton, the Court of
Criminal Appeals discussed article I, section 10, by saying:
It is not necessary that the party desiring counsel should be preparing a defense against
some accusation after an indictment found or after arrest. The statute is broader and fully
comprehends every possible situation in which an accused person or person under arrest
or not under arrest desires to consult with counsel, or communicate with counsel, or
obtain advice or services of counsel in the protection of his rights, or even supposed legal
rights.
Id. at 427, 153 S.W. at 336; see also Ex Parte Brown, 38 Tex. Crim. 295, 304, 42 S.W. 554, 556
(1897)(statute prohibiting cold storage of liquor held violative of Texas Constitution as interference with property rights). The Court of Criminal Appeals speaking of the Texas Constitution stated:
[The] Bill of Rights' lays down the ancient limitations which have always been considered
essential in a constitutional government ... and there are scattered through the instrument some other express provisions in restraint of legislative authority. But the affirmative prescriptions and general arrangements of the constitution are far more fruitful of
restraints upon the legislative power.
Brown, 38 Tex. Crim. at 304, 42 S.W. at 556; see also Ellis v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 583, 586,
197 S.W.2d 351, 353 (1946)(right to counsel guarantees right of consultation in preparation for
trial); Turner v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 627, 632, 241 S.W. 162, 164 (1922)(police refusal to grant
private consultation between attorney and accused violated state constitution).
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motorists from the drunken driver. 3
As early as 1917, Texas made the act of driving while intoxicated a criminal offense,3 2 and by 1923 it had been elevated to felony status.33 In 1969,

Texas incorporated into its D.W.I. statute an implied consent provision.34
The term "implied consent" is a legal fiction which presupposes that every
person who drives upon a public road consents to the administration of an
intoxilyzer test when arrested for suspicion of driving while intoxicated.3 5
Such statutes began to emerge in state legislation after the United States
Supreme Court's 1952 ruling in Rochin v. California36 appeared to prohibit
nonconsensual searches by police. 37 As states wrestled with increasing num-

31. See Lightner, Victims of Crime: M.A.D.D. at the Courts, (Mothers Against Drunk
Driving),23 JUDGES J. 36, 39 (Spring 1984)(increased public awareness resulting in nationwide
movement to prevent drunk driving). Studies indicate that the risk associated with drunk
driving is relatively small. See H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRUNK DRIVER 107 (rev. ed. 1984).
The chances of an accident occurring while driving intoxicated are 4.5 in 10,000. Id. Nevertheless, the chances of a sober driver having an accident are .00016 which is nearly three times
less than the drunk driver. However, this low risk to individuals is deceptive when considered
with the major social harm due to the fact that some intoxicated drivers present a greater
danger than others. Lanza-Kaduce '- Bishop, Legal Fictions and Criminology: The Jurisprudence of Drunk Driving, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 358, 364, n. 35 (1986). It is estimated
that more than half of all traffic deaths on the nation's highways are alcohol-related. Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, 1 (1983). Given these statistics, at least two commentators
urge the enactment of policies which attempt group control rather than those that attempt to
regulate individual control which seems ineffective. See Lanza-Kaduce & Bishop, Legal Fictions and Criminology: The Jurisprudenceof Drunk Driving, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
358, 374 (1986). Laws that cover an entire group, for example, drinking age statutes, have
much greater effect than individual control statutes such as D.W.I. laws. Id. at 376.
32. See Act of April 9, 1917, ch. 207, § 13, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 474, 477 (driving while
intoxicated on public road outlawed), repealed by Act of May 28, 1923, ch. 23, § 3, 1923 Tex.
Gen. Laws 56.
33. See Act of May 28, 1923, ch. 23, § 2, 1923 Tex. Gen. Laws 56 (felony punishable by
up to 2 years in prison for D.W.I.).
34. Act of June 24, 1969, ch. 434, § 1, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 1468 (enactment of implied
consent statute).
35. See Lerblance, Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 39, 41-42 (1978)(consent to intoxilyzer text implied by statute).
36. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
37. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174 (forced search by police violated due process clause thus
requiring reversal of conviction). In Rochin, the conduct of police was such that it "shocks the
conscience" and, thus, offended the requirements of due process. Id. at 171-72. In an attempt
to retrieve suspected drugs, which the defendant had placed in his mouth, the police tried to
forcibly extract them. When this failed, the defendant was taken to a hospital where he was
forced to ingest an emetic causing him to regurgitate the suspected drugs. The Supreme Court
reversed Rochin's conviction because of the brutal tactics used by police. Id. at 172.
The Rochin decision compelled state legislatures to enact implied consent statutes in an
effort to avoid any constitutional limitations imposed by a suspect's refusal to consent to blood
or breath testing. See Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel. The Case
Against Implied Consent, 58 TEX. L. REV. 935, 937-38 (1980). However, any concern about
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bers of traffic fatalities attributed to alcohol, the concept of implied consent
offered an attractive means to remove drunk drivers from the road. 31 In
1983, the Texas Legislature amended the implied consent statute to make
driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.10 percent or more, a strict liability
offense. 39 The amendment also imposed penalties for refusing to submit to
an intoxilyzer test.'" The D.W.I. statute does permit the suspect to refuse

the test. 4' However, the suspect who refuses the test loses the right to drive
for 90 days unless, at a subsequent hearing, the suspect can show that proper
procedures were not followed. 42

the constitutionality of nonconsensual testing was relieved in the Supreme Court's decision in

Breithaupt v. Abram which held that a D.W.I. suspect could be compelled to give a blood
sample. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-37 (1957)(taking of unconsented blood
sample not offensive to constitution).
38. See Cramton, The Problem of the DrinkingDriver, 54 A.B.A. J. 995, 997 (1968). Law
enforcement authorities viewed the implied consent law, coupled with the establishment of a
statutory definition of intoxication based on blood alcohol concentration, as an effective means
to combat the drunk driver. Id.
39. See Forte v. State, 707 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)(discussing 1983 amendments to statute); see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 (Vernon Supp. 1989)(intoxication defined as having blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or above). Prior to the
1983 amendment, a blood alcohol content of 0.10% established a rebuttable presumption of
intoxication. See Forte, 707 S.W.2d at 93 (0.10% alcohol creates presumption of intoxication).
The former statute also did not allow introduction into evidence of the defendant's refusal to
take the test. See Nevarez v. State, 671 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no
pet.)(refusal to take breath test inadmissible).
40. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The penalties
for driving while intoxicated are significantly more severe than those for refusing the test.
Compare TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1(c)-(f) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(penalties for
D.W.I.) with TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1989)(penalties for
refusing test). Id.
41. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
42. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2(f) (Vernon Supp. 1989). When a
D.W.I. suspect refuses to take the test, the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety
must notify the suspect of the driver's license suspension. Id. This notice must be by certified
mail. Id. The suspension takes effect 28 days after receipt of the notice or 31 days if he refused
to accept delivery of the notice. Id.
A D.W.I. suspect who refuses the test has the right to a hearing to challenge the license
suspension. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989). This hearing is civil in nature as opposed to a D.W.I. proceeding which is a criminal prosecution.
Robinson v. Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety, 586 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979,
no pet.). The D.W.I. suspect has 20 days after receipt of the notice, or 23 days if he refused to
accept the notice, to request a hearing. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2(f)
(Vernon 1989). Once such a request is made, the Department of Public Safety must, within 10
days, request a court to set a hearing. Id.
At the hearing, the court is required to make affirmative findings on three issues. Id. First,
the court must find that the police officer had probable cause to believe that the suspect was
driving on a public highway or beach while intoxicated. Id. Second, the court must find that
the suspect was arrested and given the opportunity to provide a breath or blood sample for
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To counter the apparent Hobson's choice confronting the D.W.I. suspect,
constitutional challenges have been brought to defeat implied consent statutes.43 Although the suspect may acquiesce in order to avoid the penalty, he
cannot later claim that his fifth amendment rights were violated because he
was compelled to incriminate himself." Furthermore, breath or blood samples taken from'a D.W.I. suspect do not constitute an unlawful search or
seizure under the fourth amendment.4 5 Fourteenth amendment due process

analysis. TEX. REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2(f) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Third, the
court must find that the suspect refused the police officer's request to provide a sample. Id. If
the court makes affirmative findings on each of the three issues, the Department of Public
Safety shall suspend the suspect's driver's license for 90 days. Id. However, if the court finds
that one or more of the events did not occur, his license must be reinstated. TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 20) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
The D.W.I. statute is somewhat confusing in that it is not entirely clear whether the suspension is "automatic" within the strict sense of that term. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 67011-5 § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(required warnings to D.W.I. suspect) with TEX. REV.
CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2(f) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(procedure for obtaining hearing). In
section 2(b) the statute states that the suspect who refuses the test must be informed that his
driver's license will be "automatically suspended for 90 days after the date of adjournment of
the hearing provided for in Subsection (f) of this section." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
67011-5 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(emphasis added). This language implies that the suspension does not occur until after the hearing is held. See id. However, section 2(f) states that the
director "shallsuspend" the suspect's license once the arresting officer has submitted a written
report stating that the suspect refused the test. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2(f)
(Vernon Supp. 1989)(emphasis added). This language indicates that the suspension technically
occurs before the hearing is held. See id. Furthermore, section 2(g) states that if the suspect
prevails at the hearing "the director shall reinstate" the suspect's driver's license. TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(emphasis added). The term "reinstate" implies that the suspension occurred before the hearing. See id. But see Balios v. Texas
Dept. of Pub. Safety, 733 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, writ ref'd)
(dicta)(request for hearing prevents suspension until hearing conducted). The discrepancy in
the language of the statute is significant because, under the notice timetables set out in section
2(f), it is theoretically possible for the suspension to begin before the hearing has been held.
See REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 § 2(f) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(notice and hearing
timetable).
43. See, e.g., Massie v. State, 744 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no
pet.)(court not required to give instruction that refusal to take test not admission of guilt);
Hewitt v. State, 734 S.W.2d 745, 750 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no pet.)(failure to inform
suspect of right to have blood test performed does not render test results inadmissible);
DeMangin v. State, 700 S.W.2d 329, 331-32 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.)(no
right to counsel before taking breath test).
44. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983)(admission into evidence of
refusal to take intoxilyzer test not violative of fifth amendment); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 765 (1966)(extraction of blood sample not violation of right against self-incrimination); see also Rodriguez v. State, 631 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(intoxilyzer test
does not violate state or federal protections against eelf-incrimination).
45. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766. Regarding Schmerber's fourth amendment claim,
the Supreme Court concluded that the taking of a blood sample was a search but it was reasonable under the circumstances. Id.
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arguments have also met with only limited success.46 As a result, most

states have found their implied consent statutes to be constitutionally
sound.47 Despite their apparent invincibility, continuing challenges to implied consent statutes have compelled some courts to find a limited right to
counsel for D.W.I. suspects.4 8
Following an era where the United States Supreme Court established
strong safeguards in the area of criminal procedure, 49 the Court has subsequently created exceptions to the protections afforded to the accused.5" The

46. See id. at 759-60; see also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1978)(aiutomatic
license suspension for refusing test not violative of due process). But see Sites v. State, 481
A.2d 192, 199-200 (Md. 1984)(upholding right to counsel before breath test under due process
clause of fourteenth amendment).
47. See Lerblance, Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 39, 39-41 (1978)(implied consent accepted in American law).
48. See, e.g., Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)(increasing
number of states recognizing limited right to counsel under state constitution); Sites v. State,
481 A.2d 192, 200 (Md. 1984)(limited right to counsel under fourteenth amendment and state
constitution due process clauses); People v. Gursey, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419, 239 N.E.2d 351,
353 (N.Y. 1968)(limited right to counsel implied into D.W.I. statute); Siegwald v. Curry, 319
N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974)(limited statutory right to consult with counsel before
breath test); State v. Spencer, 750 P.2d 147, 156 (Or. 1988)(limited right to consult with counsel before breath test under state constitution); State v. Welch, 376 A.2d 351, 355 (Vt.
1977)(limited right to counsel under sixth amendment critical stage analysis); State v. Fitzsimmons, 610 P.2d 893, 900-01 (Wash. 1980)(en banc)(limited right to counsel under sixth
amendment critical stage analysis), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 977 (1980). The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that the issuance of a citation for D.W.I. initiates formal judicial proceedings and the right to counsel attaches at that point. Fitzsimmons, 610 P.2d at 898;
see also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972)(right to counsel attaches upon initiation of
adversary proceedings).
49. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (1969)(double jeopardy prohibition of fifth amendment deemed fundamental right and made applicable to states by fourteenth
amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-67 (1966)(fifth amendment requires accused be informed of rights prior to police custodial interrogation); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 403 (1965)(sixth amendment confrontation clause applies to states through fourteenth
amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963)(accused's right to counsel
under sixth amendment applicable to states by fourteenth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961)(fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure made applicable to states).
50. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-92 (1984)(murder suspects have no
right to counsel while in administrative confinement even though prosecution likely); see also
Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(en banc)(Teague, J., dissenting)(United States Supreme Court no longer champion of individual liberties); J. HARRINGTON,

THE

TEXAS

BILL

OF

RIGHTS

A

COMMENTARY

AND

LITIGATION

MANUAL

2

(1987)(United States Supreme Court retreating from forefront of movement to protect individual rights); Note, Fifth and Sixth Amendments-Changing the Balance of Miranda, 77 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 666, 667 (1986)(Supreme Court failed to maintain equilibrium
between police and accused). In Gouveia, the Supreme Court concluded that although the
prisoners were interned for up to nineteen months, the presence of counsel would not aid in
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Supreme Court has approved procedures used by police which have had the
effect of decreasing the defendant's access to retained counsel." The exclusionary rule5 2 has been narrowed5 3 while the defendant's Miranda rights
have also had exceptions carved from them. 4 As the United States Supreme
Court has retreated from its leading role as guardian of individual rights,55
the duty of protecting those rights has shifted to the state courts which must
decide whether to grant greater liberties to their citizens than the federal
Constitution currently affords. 56 As a whole, state constitutions grant
broader rights to the individual than does the federal Constitution.5 7 While
the Texas Constitution contains greater protections of individual rights than

preserving evidence. 467 U.S. at 191. The fact that pretrial investigation may be desired is
irrelevant because the right to counsel does not create a right to a private investigator. Id.
51. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)(police not required to inform suspect
of counsel's attempts to contact him).
52. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-89 (1976)(exclusionary rule commands that all
evidence obtained in violation of defendant's rights is inadmissible at trial).
53. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440-50 (1984)(creation of inevitable discovery
exception to exclusionary rule). The United States Supreme Court first suggested the inevitable discovery exception the first time Williams came before the Court. See Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 407 n.12 (1977).
54. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1985)(invalid confession admissible when
made second time after receiving Miranda warnings); see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 653-60 (1984)(public safety exception grafted onto Miranda rule). According to the Miranda rule, the police must inform arrested suspects of their constitutional rights before commencing a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966).
Discussion of the applicability of the Miranda rule is required when the sixth amendment right
to counsel is concerned because the fifth amendment protections offered by the rule are intertwined with the sixth amendment. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442-44, 466 (presence of counsel
at interrogation protects defendant from blatant or subtle police intimidation).
55. J. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY AND LITIGATION
MANUAL 2 (1987)(United States Supreme Court retreating from protections of individual liberties); Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States. The Revival of State Constitutions As
Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 547 (1986)(Supreme Court restricting
guarantees of individual rights); cf Comment, The Pendulum Swings: The Rehnquist Court
and the De-Emphasis of Individual Liberty in Criminal Procedure Analysis, 65 U. DET. L.
REV. 291, 294 (1988)(United States Supreme Court limiting civil rights).
56. J.

HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS:

A

COMMENTARY AND LITIGATION

7-9 (1987). In more than 400 cases since 1970, state courts have been more protective of individual rights than has the United States Supreme Court. Id. at I. But see Spaeth,
Burger Court Review of State Court Civil Liberties Decisions, 68 JUDICATURE 285, 285
(1985)(asserting Supreme Court more protective of liberties than state courts). See generally,
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489,
495, 498-504 (1977)(state courts should extend individual rights beyond federal constitution).
MANUAL

57. J. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS A COMMENTARY AND LITIGATION
MANUAL 7 (1987). Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Michigan,

New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, among others, have extended state protections beyond those of the federal system. Id.
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its federal counterpart, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation
of the Texas Constitution has generally relied on the narrower federal constitution for guidance.5" The right to counsel contained in article I, section 10
of the Texas Constitution has not been significantly analyzed since the court
held that defendants do not have the right to "hybrid representation" at
trial.59 However, recent decisions from the Texas intermediate appellate
courts have directly confronted the issue of the right to counsel at an intoxilyzer test under article I, section 10.60 A split of authority emerged which
failed to resolve the issue. 6'

58. See Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 798-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(court interpreted
article I, section 9 of Texas Constitution as no broader than fourth amendment of United
States Constitution); see also Douglas, Federalism and State Constitutions, 13 VT. L. REV. 127,
138-39 (1988)(Texas Court of Criminal Appeals harmonizes Texas Constitution with federal
constitution).
59. See Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272, 274-75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)(court discussed
but did not reach conclusion about whether state and federal right to counsel offers same
protections). "Hybrid representation" refers to instances where a defendant is represented at
trial and has also retained co-counsel to aid in the defense at trial. Id. at 280.
60. See Forte v. State, 686 S.W.2d 744, 754 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985)(D.W.I. suspect has limited right to counsel), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 707 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986); see also Martinez v. State, 712 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986,
pet ref'd)(no right to counsel). The Oregon Supreme Court recently interpreted its constitutional right to counsel provision to determine when the right attaches. See State v. Spencer,
750 P.2d 147, 156 (Or. 1988)(D.W.I. suspect has right to counsel before taking breath test).
The court concluded that under the state constitution the right does attach prior to the formal
charging of the suspect. Id. The Court reasoned:
A person taken into formal custody by the police on a potentially criminal charge is
confronted with the full legal power of the state, regardless of whether a formal charge
has been filed. Where such custody is complete, neither the lack of a selected charge nor
the possibility that the police will think better of the entire matter changes the fact that
the arrested person is, at that moment, ensnared in a 'criminal prosecution.' The evanescent nature of the evidence the police seek to obtain may justify substantially limiting the
time in which the person may exercise his or her Article I, Section 11, right, but it does
not justify doing away with it.
Id. at 155-56. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the right to counsel existed under the
article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. Id. at 156. In pertinent part, Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right... to be heard by himself and counsel." Id. Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution is drafted similarly to the corresponding Texas constitutional provision containing several rights in that each respective section contains a single paragraph listing the rights of
the accused. Compare OR. CONST. art. I, § 11 (defendant has right to be heard by himself or
counsel) with TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 (defendant has right to be heard by himself or counsel
or both). See also Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)(Texas constitutional provision drafted in manner contrary to federal Constitution).
61. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 712 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, pet.
ref'd)(no right to counsel); McKinnon v. State, 709 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1986, no pet.)(no right to counsel); Forte, 686 S.W.2d at 752-54 (granting right to counsel),
rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 707 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)(en banc).
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In Forte v. State,62 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a
D.W.I. suspect does not have the right to counsel under the Texas Constitution "until the time the complaint [is] filed." 63 The court specifically re64
jected the United States Supreme Court's holding in Kirby v. Illinois,
which determined a defendant's right to counsel under the sixth amendment
attaches when formal proceedings are initiated.65 Instead, the court adopted
the "critical stage" analysis of United States v. Wade 66 to establish the Texas
test regarding when the right to counsel attaches under the Texas Constitution. 67 Under the newly adopted test, the proper inquiry into pretrial proceedings is whether counsel is required to prevent the derogation of a
"known right or safeguard."6 8 In the case of an intoxilyzer proceeding, the
court reasoned that because consent to the test is implied by statute and the
suspect has no legal right to refuse the test, counsel's presence would not
serve to protect "any known right or safeguard.", 69 Thus, the decision to

62. 759 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
63. Id. at 139. The court derived this language from its earlier decision when it considered the issue under the sixth amendment. See Forte v. State, 707 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986)(sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach until after the intoxilyzer test is
taken).
64. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)(no right to counsel until commencement of adversary proceedings).
65. See Forte, 759 S.W.2d at 134 (court rejected Kirby decision). The Court of Criminal
Appeals called the initiation of formal charges an arbitrary and capricious point at which to
grant the right to counsel. Id. After reviewing precedent from the United States Supreme
Court concerning the sixth amendment, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the
reasoning behind those decisions failed to realistically address the situation. Id. The court
noted the distinct conflict between the Supreme Court's "critical stage" analysis in United
States Y. Wade and its later holding in Kirby v. Illinois which decreed that the initiation of
adversarial judicial proceedings demarcates the point at which the right to counsel attaches.
Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the Supreme Court's analysis faulty when the
Wade and Kirby decisions were closely scrutinized. See Forte, 759 S.W.2d at 134, 138 (Wade
and Kirby decisions may be impossible to reconcile). In Wade, the Supreme Court found that
the inherent dangers in a post-indictment interrogation lineup were a critical stage requiring
the presence of counsel. 388 U.S. 218, 228, 236-37 (1967). Yet, in Kirby, a pre-indictment
lineup did not warrant counsel even though the same dangers existed as in a post-indictment
lineup. 406 U.S. 682, 697-98 (1972)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)(right to counsel attaches at any pretrial critical stage).
67. See Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 137-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)(court must look at
stage of pretrial confrontation rather than rely on set rule to establish point at which right to
counsel attaches). The key to the "critical stage" analysis is that the right to counsel activates
when counsel's presence becomes essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial. See
Wade, 388 U.S. at 226 (counsel necessary to prevent prejudice to trial rights).
68. Forte, 759 S.W.2d at 138.
69. Id. at 139. The court acknowledged that although an attorney could advise his client
to physically refuse to take the test, this would merely be "strategic maneuvering" which is not
encompassed by the protections of article I, section 10. See id. at 139 n.20. However, the
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70
take an intoxilyzer test cannot be considered a "critical stage."
Judge Clinton, joined by Judge Teague, dissented on the ground that the
Texas implied consent statute clearly recognizes the accused's right to refuse
the test. 7 ' The dissent viewed the suspect's decision to exercise his right to
refuse the intoxilyzer test as a "critical stage" due to the consequences which
emanate from the choice to refuse or acquiesce. 72 Judge Clinton concluded
that because the advice of an attorney could aid the suspect in making this
decision, the breathalyzer test must be characterized as a pre-indictment
critical stage because the suspect's choice will affect him in future judicial
proceedings. 73 Judge Clinton supported his conclusion by reasoning that because the legislature has granted the right to refuse the test, article I, section
10 extends the right to counsel when making that choice.74
The Forte majority incorrectly held that the decision to take an intoxilyzer
test is not a critical stage requiring the limited right to consult with counsel. 7 - The court employed a mode of analysis which relegates the Texas
Constitution to a subservient position to the federal Constitution, thus failing to recognize its independent vitality. 76 Furthermore, the decision to consent to an intoxilyzer test should be deemed a "critical stage" because the

court specifically rejected the notion that an attorney who advises a client to refuse the test is
acting unethically. Id.
70. Forte, 759 S.W.2d at 139.
71. Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 139-41. (Clinton, J., dissenting). Judge Clinton reasoned that the concept of implied consent has become obsolete since the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California. Id. at 140; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966)(extraction of blood sample over suspect's objection is permissible). The Texas Legislature has acknowledged this fact by requiring the extraction of breath
or blood samples, regardless of whether the suspect has consented, when there has been an
accident in which death has occurred or is likely to occur. Forte, 759 S.W.2d at 140.
72. Id. at 140.
73. Id. (citing Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1213 (Alaska 1983)). In Copelin, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that the statutorily granted right to counsel, when applied in
conjunction with Alaska's D.W.I. statute, required that the accused be permitted to consult
with counsel before taking a breath test. 659 P.2d at 1210.
74. Forte, 759 S.W.2d at 140-41.
75. See, e.g., Sites v. State, 481 A.2d 192, 200 (Md. 1984)(limited right to counsel under
fourteenth amendment and state constitution); People v. Gursey, 239 N.E.2d 351, 353 (N.Y.
1968)(limited statutory right to consult with counsel); Siegwald v. Curry, 319 N.E.2d 381, 385
(Ohio Ct. App. 1974)(limited statutory right to consult with counsel); State v. Spencer, 750
P.2d 147, 156 (Or. 1988)(en banc)(D.W.I. suspect has limited right to counsel under state
constitution); State v. Welch, 376 A.2d 351, 355 (Vt. 1977)(limited right to counsel granted
using sixth amendment critical stage analysis); State v. Fitzsimmons, 610 P.2d 893, 900-01
(Wash.)(limited right to counsel under sixth amendment critical stage analysis), vacated on
other grounds, 449 U.S. 977 (1980).
76. See Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(Clinton, J., concurring)(court abdicates judicial duties when it interprets state constitution as no broader than
federal Constitution); Douglas, Federalism and State Constitutions, 13 VT. L. REV. 127, 138
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potential for substantial prejudice to the trial rights of the accused is great."
Consultation with counsel would help ensure that the state's important interest in removing drunk drivers from the road is properly balanced against
the accused's right to make intelligent decisions in the preparation of his
defense.78
The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly adopted its own test to determine when the right to counsel attaches under the state constitution, but
erred in allowing the federal Constitution to dominate the analysis.79 After
the court completed its thorough analysis using the Texas test, the result was
the same as if it had been decided under the sixth amendment to the United

States Constitution.

°

Apparently, the majority chose to use a dual reliance method of state con-

stitutional analysis wherein federal and state constitutional provisions are
paralleled.8 ' The effect of this method is to subordinate the state constitution to the federal Constitution. 2 While this has been an acceptable method
of analysis, it has been suggested that the dual reliance method is outmoded

(1988)(Texas Court of Criminal Appeals unwilling to remain independent and has become
judicial colony of United States Supreme Court).
77. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)(right to counsel attaches when
there exists potential for substantial prejudice to rights of accused); see also State v. Spencer,
750 P.2d 147, 155 (Or. 1988)(en banc)(right to counsel during investigatory stage as important
as presence of attorney at trial itself).
78. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979)(highway safety is compelling state
interest); see also Comment, Minnesota Meets Drunk DriversHead-On, 12 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 673, 703-04 (1986)(interest in removing drunk drivers does not warrant deprivation of
right to counsel).
79. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 379, 383-84 (1980)(states should look to state constitution before looking to federal constitution); see also Mahady, Toward a Theory of State ConstitutionalJurisprudence: A Judge's
Thoughts, 13 VT. L. REV. 145, 146-52 (1988)(states should not deny independence of their

state constitutions).
80. See Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)(right to counsel
attaches under Texas Constitution at same time as under sixth amendment to United States
Constitution).
81. See Forte, 759 S.W.2d at 131-39 (analysis of right to counsel under federal and state
constitutions). See generally J. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY AND LITIGATION MANUAL, 36 (1987)(under dual reliance state and federal Constitutions evaluated separately but concurrently).
82. Id. The potential problem with the dual reliance method is that the federal constitution overshadows its state counterpart and so the independent nature of the state constitution
is ignored. Id. The state constitution is reviewed almost as an afterthought. Id.; see also
Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile.: State Court Comment on FederalConstitutional
Issues when Disposing of Cases on State ConstitutionalGrounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1029
(1985)(under dual reliance method state courts merely apply federal analysis to state constitutional provisions).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University,

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [], No. 1, Art. 9

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:233

in light of the commands of the new federalism. 3 The main premise of new
federalism is that state government must once again assume the dominant
role as the principal guardian of individual rights.8 4 The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Long encourages states to create
"independent and adequate state grounds" on which to base their decisions.8 5 By basing decisions upon accepted and well reasoned state authority, states maintain their judicial legitimacy and are independent of the
83. See Abrahamson & Gutmann, The New Federalism: State Constitutions and State
Courts, 71 JUDICATURE 88, 90 (1987)(Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), creates new
debate on role of federalism). One definition of new federalism is:
New federalism refers to the renewed willingness of state courts to rely on their own law,
in order to decide questions involving individual rights. In new federalism, the federal
constitution establishes the minimum rather than the maximum guarantees of individual
rights, and the state courts determine, according to their own law (generally their own
state constitutions), the nature of the protection against state government. New federalism also includes the potential for greater deference by federal courts to state court proceedings and decisions.
Id. at 90. The above-quoted definition of new federalism represents the "expansionist" view in
which the primary goal of new federalism is to expand fundamental rights and liberties. See
Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the
Revolution in State ConstitutionalLaw, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 34 (1988)(discussing revolution in
state constitutional law). A second view of the new federalism movement sees it as a vehicle to
create an independent body of state constitutional law. Id. at 35. This view is known as the
"independent state jurisprudence" view, which has as its main goal the creation of state law
which reflects the unique history and constitutional heritage of the state. Id. This view does
not regard as of any consequence the fact that the state courts' decisions may be more or less
conservative than those of the United States Supreme Court. Id.
84. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 379, 379-380 (1980)(discussing responsibility of state courts concerning individual
rights); Oakes, State Courts in a Time of Federal ConstitutionalChange, 13 VT. L. REV. 323,
335 (1988) (Supreme Court placed task of protecting individual liberties on state courts); see
also Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on
the Revolution in State ConstitutionalLaw, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 16 (1988)(revolution in state
constitutional law encourages states to view federal Constitution as only providing basic floor
of constitutional rights).
85. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983)(Supreme Court will review state
court decisions unless based on independent and adequate state grounds). After years of reviewing state court decisions, which were based upon both federal and state law, the Supreme
Court clarified the boundry lines between federal and state jurisdiction and directed state
courts to base their decisions on independent and adequate state grounds in order to avoid
federal review. Id. at 1041. Expressing respect for the independence of state courts, the
Supreme Court stated, "We believe that such an approach will provide state judges with a
clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, and yet
will preserve the integrity of the federal law." Id. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has
sounded the call to state judges to actively develop state law. See Douglas, Federalism and
State Constitutions, 13 VT. L. REV. 127, 136 (1988)(Long decision requires state judges to take
stand on issues). State courts are now required to participate in the federal system and grapple
with the complicated issues of the day without merely relying on federal analysis. Id. at 13637.
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federal system.8
The modem approach to state constitutional analysis is the primacy
method which has been adopted by several states.8 7 This mode of analysis
first looks to the state constitution for individual rights protection and, then,
proceeds to examine federal law if state law is found to be inadequate. 8 The
primacy method provides the theoretical underpinnings to achieve the
Supreme Court's dictate in Long because state constitutions are viewed as
the primary source of law on which to base decisions.8 9 Aside from the
creation of an independent body of state law free from dependence on the
federal system, the benefits of the primacy method are two-fold.9 ° First, it
encourages states to develop a body of law which reflects their individual
history, culture, and values. 9 Second, the development of state constitu-

86. See Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(Teague, J., dissenting)(independent judiciary sacrificed when state courts merely mimic United States Supreme
Court); Mahady, Toward a Theory of State ConstitutionalJurisprudence:A Judge's Thoughts,
13 VT. L. REV. 145, 149, 153 (1988)(to maintain legitimacy state courts must use accepted
independent state authority when analyzing state constitution); Teachout, Against the Stream:
An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 19 (1988)(one role of state courts is to free state law from
federal control).
87. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscoveringthe States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 379, 382-84 (1980)(discussing primacy of state constitutions in federal system); see also
Mahady, Toward a Theory of State ConstitutionalJurisprudence: A Judge's Thoughts, 13 VT.
L. REV. 145, 146 (state's own constitution should be reviewed before looking at other constitutions). Maine, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermont are among the states who have followed the primacy method. See, e.g., State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me.
1984)(looking to federal issue only after examining issue under state law); State v. Ball, 471
A.2d 347, 354 (N.H. 1983)(federal issue not reached because state constitution violated); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981)(when state law provides remedy court should not
reach federal issue); State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 236-37 (Vt. 1985)(issue decided on state
grounds after thorough discussion of methods of state constitutional law analysis). The Texas
Supreme Court has employed the primacy method on occasion. See Sax v. Votteler, 648
S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983)(court refused to review issue under federal Constitution); Haynes
v. City of Abilene, 659 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. 1983)(court's decision based primarily on state
constitution with only cursory mention of federal constitution).
88. See Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the
Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 983 (1985)(under primacy method court looks to federal law only if state law permits alleged infringement).
89. See Mahady, Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Judge's
Thoughts, 13 VT. L. REV. 145, 146-52 (1988)(theory of primacy of state constitution requires
that decisions be based on state authority).
90. See Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 19 (1988)(state
courts have responsibility to create independent body of state law, free from federal control,
which will aid development of American constitutional jurisprudence).
91. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986)(limitations on government
and individual rights guaranteed in Texas Constitution reflect the values, customs, and traditions of Texas); see also Mahady, Toward a Theory of State ConstitutionalJurisprudence: A
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tional law strengthens American jurisprudence because state court comment
adds to the9 2national debate concerning constitutional law and principals of
federalism.

The development of a body of law fashioned from state authority, the first
benefit of the primacy method, recognizes the unique character of each
state. 93 A court employing the primacy method is free to look to the history
and traditional values of the state when deciding whether to expand the state
constitution beyond the scope of its federal counterpart. 94 State courts that

Judge's Thoughts, 13 VT. L. REV. 145, 149 (1988)(independent body of state law necessary
because each state has different economic, ethical, and social concerns); Kaye, Contributions of
State Constitutional Law to the Third Century of American Federalism, 13 VT. L. REv. 49, 55
(1988)(states have values which are distinctively their own). State courts function to tailor
laws suited to the citizens of the particular state to meet local needs and situations while the
federal courts serve the different function of establishing minimum protections which are applicable to all people living within a diverse nation such as the United States. Id.
92. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986)(enforcing state constitution
strengthens federalism); see also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977)(believers in concept of federalism salute development of state constitutional law).
93. See Feldman & Abney, The Double Security of Federalism: Protecting Individual Liberties Under the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115, 117 (1988)(each state has own
unique qualities); Kaye, Contributions of State Constitutional Law to the Third Century of
American Federalism, 13 VT. L. REV. 49, 54-55 (1988)(history shapes each state's cultural
values); Sager, State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 975-76 (1985)(state judiciary aware of history and social
experience of state citizens).
94. See, e.g., J. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY AND
LITIGATION MANUAL 45 (1987)(use of historical approach to determine intent of framers of
Texas Constitution); Mahady, Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Jurisprudence: A
Judge's Thoughts, 13 VT. L. REV. 145, 149 (1988)(state court should look to citizen's sociological, ethical, and economic concerns when resolving state constitutional issue); Teachout,
Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution
in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 39-43 (1988)(state constitutional law must be
faithful to its unique traditions).
History suggests that the Texas Constitution should be interpreted to be broader and more
protective than the federal Constitution. See TEX. CONST. PREAMBLE, interp. commentary
(Vernon 1984)(synopsis of Texas history); see also Ponton, Sources of Liberty in the Texas Bill
of Rights, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 93, 100 (1988)(Texans' unique character creates philosophical
difference between state and federal Constitutions); Thomas & Thomas, The Texas Constitution of 1876, 35 TEX. L. REV. 907, 913 (1957)(framers of Texas Constitution intended to
provide greatest possible protections to prevent reoccurrence of flagrant abuses of power). The
Texas Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole so that each section and clause is construed
in harmony with the entire document. See, e.g., Jones v. Williams, 121 Tex. 94, 111, 45
S.W.2d 130, 137 (1931)(constitution to be interpreted as a whole); Pierson v. State, 147 Tex.
Crim. 15, 19, 177 S.W.2d 975, 977 (1944)(constitution construed as whole to ascertain intent
of framers); Ex parte Woods, 52 Tex Crim. 575, 585, 108 S.W. 1171, 1176 (1908)(sections of
statute may be interpreted with aid from other sections within same statute).
The Texas Constitution contains many substantive protections not found in the federal Con-
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merely mimic federal law do so at the risk of harming state sovereignty.9 5
Furthermore, a state court's adherence to a particular federal position may
result in a holding contrary and repugnant to the traditional values of the
state citizenry. 6

stitution. See Thomas & Thomas, The Texas Constitution of 1876, 35 TEX. L. REV. 907, 914
(1957). In Texas, for example, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is absolutely prohibited. Id. The Bill of Rights is inviolate and military authority will always be subordinate to
civil government. Id. Texas even has an equal rights amendment. See TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 3a (adopted 1972). Regarding the judiciary, the "open courts" provision guarantees access
to the court system which is an additional due process guarantee not found at the federal level.
See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (courts shall be open to all individuals). Thus, under historical
analysis, or established rules of construction, the Texas Constitution extends beyond the safeguards of the United States Constitution. See J. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS:
A COMMENTARY AND LITIGATION MANUAL 38-48 (1987)(examination of Texas Constitution
under various methods of analysis).

95. See Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(Teague, J., dissenting)(state constitutional decisions which mimic decisions of United States Supreme Court sacrifice independent state judiciary); see also Duncan, Terminating the Guardianship: A New
Role for State Courts, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 809, 855 (1988)(construing state constitution invokes state sovereignty principles).
96. Cf Exparte Woods, 52 Tex. Crim. 575, 588-89, 108 S.W. 1171, 1178 (1908)(occupation tax held unconstitutional under Texas Constitution). In discussing the construction of the
state constitution the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
A Constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some
subsequent time, when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a
different rule in the case seem desirable. A principal share of the benefit expected from
written constitutions would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend
to circumstances or be modified by public opinion ....

Those beneficent maxims of the

common law which guard person and property have grown and expanded until they mean
vastly more to us than they did to our ancestors, and are more minute, particular, and
pervading in their protections; and we may confidently look forward in the future to still
further modifications in the direction of improvement. Public sentiment and action effect
such changes, and the courts recognize them; but a court or Legislature which should
allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in the intention of its founders would be
justly chargeable with reckless disregard of official oath and public duty, and, if its course
could become a precedent, these instruments would be of little avail. The violence of
public passion is quite as likely to be in the direction of oppression as in any other; and the
necessity for Bills of Rights in our fundamental laws lies mainly in the danger that the
Legislature will be influenced, by temporary excitements, and passions among the people,
to adopt oppressive enactments. What a court is to do, therefore, is to declare the law as
written, leaving it to the people themselves to make such changes as new circumstances
may require.
Id. at 588-89, 108 S.W. at 1175-76 (quoting COOLEY, COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 68-69 (6th ed.)). The importance of constitutional protections stressed in Woods is pertinent to the current public sentiment concerning drunk driving. See Lightner, Victims of
Crime: MA.D.D. at the Court. (Mothers Against Drunk Driving), 23 JUDGE'S J. 36, 39 (Spring
1984)(nationwide movement to spark public awareness of D.W.I.); Texas Lawyer, Jan. 16,
1989, at 6, col. 1 (Texas D.P.S. troopers under tremendous pressure to make D.W.I. arrests).
With public attention focused upon current issues, dangers arise that constitutional protections
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The second, and perhaps the single most important benefit of the primacy
method is its contribution to American constitutional law.97 State experimentation in the area of constitutional liberties provides the trial and error
experience on a limited scale which, if fruitful, may be incorporated into
federal constitutional law.9" Once tested at the state level, the United States
Supreme Court, with a tolerable degree of certainty, can establish laws that
reflect the values of the citizens of our diverse nation.9 9 By interpreting the
Texas Constitution as it has, the Court of Criminal Appeals has missed the
opportunity to originate, rather than duplicate, state constitutional

jurisprudence. I00
Besides failing to utilize the benefits of the primacy method, the Forte
may be shoved to the side. See Hart, The Bill of Rights: Safeguard of Individual Liberty, 35
TEX. L. REV. 919, 919-20 (1957)(as conditions which gave rise to Bill of Rights fade into past,
danger arises that individual liberties will not be appreciated and may be weakened or
abandoned).
97. See Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in State ConstitutionalLaw, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 18 (1988)(state
constitutional jurisprudence influences the course of American constitutional law); Utter,
Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile. State Court Comment on Federal ConstitutionalIssues
When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1041-47
(1985)(state courts construing federal Constitution essential to federal debate).
98. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-54 (1961)(Supreme Court reviewing state experimentation of exclusionary rule before implementing it on national level); see also Feldman &
Abney, The Double Security of Federalism: Protecting Individual Liberty Under the Arizona
Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115, 117-18 (1988)(states serve as laboratories for economic
and social experimentation); Kaye, Contributionsof State ConstitutionalLaw to the Third Century of American Federalism, 13 VT. L. REV. 49, 56-57 (1988)(illustrating Supreme Court's
examination of state experience and its influence on federal law).
99. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931)(Brandeis, J., dissenting)(states experimentation necessary in federal system). Justice Brandeis extolled the virtues
of state experimentation by saying:
There must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through experimentation,
our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs ....
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation.
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.
Id.
100. See Duncan, Terminating the Guardianship: A New Role for State Courts, 19 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 809, 855 (1988)(advocating development of state constitutional law under principles of new federalism). In the conclusion of his article, Judge Duncan challenges the Court of
Criminal Appeals to "accept its responsibility and independently judge the protections afforded its citizens under article I, section 9, of the Texas Constitution." Id. By analogy, Judge
Duncan's article provides an effective criticism of the Forte majority's interpretation of article
I, section 10, of the Texas Constitution because, aside from urging the court to accept responsibility for interpreting state constitution, Judge Duncan encouraged the court not to "march
lock-step with the United States Supreme Court." Id. But see Texas Lawyer, Jan. 30, 1989, at
1, col. 1. (opponents of new federalism propose constitutional amendment to prohibit Court of
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decision places the D.W.I. suspect in a precarious position because the suspect must make an important decision, without the aid of counsel, which
will affect important rights in future judicial proceedings.' ° ' The critical
stage analysis adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals holds that the right
to counsel will not attach until the D.W.I. suspect requires counsel's presence to protect a "known right or safeguard." 1 °2 The administration of the
intoxilyzer test marks the time when the D.W.I. suspect must make the crucial decision whether to confront the coercive power of the state in a civil
proceeding or in a criminal prosecution. 113 Should the suspect consent to an
intoxilyzer test and fail, the damning testimony of the test results virtually
ensure that the person will be marked with a criminal conviction." ° The
classification of the offense as a strict liability crime means that the D.W.I.
suspect who tests 0.10 percent or above in blood alcohol concentration is,
assuming all other procedures are properly followed, convicted at the time
he takes the test. ° 5 On the other hand, the suspect who refuses the test

Criminal Appeals from interpreting state constitution as affording greater rights than federal
constitution).
101. See Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)(en banc)(Clinton, J.,
dissenting)(D.W.I. suspect must make critical choice which will affect future proceedings,
quoting Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1213 (Alaska 1983)).
102. See id. at 138 (counsel required only when necessary to preserve rights and safeguards of accused).
103. See Comment, Public Outcry v. Individual Rights: Right to Counsel and the Drunk
Driver's Dilemma, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 278, 293-98 (1986)(D.W.I. suspect faces civil proceeding
for refusal of test or criminal proceeding if test results indicate suspect intoxicated); see also
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1989)(providing for suspension of
license for refusing test); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1 §§ (c)-(f)(Vernon Supp.
1989)(listing criminal penalties for D.W.I.).
104. See State v. Sutherburg, 402 A.2d 1294, 1297 (Me. 1979)(trial court comments on
intoxilyzer results). After a jury trial, the trial judge rendered an excessive sentence for the
D.W.I. offense. Id. at 1296-97. The court was angered by the defendant's demand for a jury
trial in light of the evidence against him. The trial judge commented:
A .29 blood test is ordinarily a sufficiently high test that warrants a non-trial . . .
[O]rdinarily I don't care about what it costs to give a man a trial because he is entitled to
it, but I do expect that he has some justification for trying the case. In other words there
must be some reason to believe that a jury will find him innocent, and I find it difficult in
this case with a .29 test to justify the expenditure of [an extra $1,000. for a jury trial].
Id. at 1296.
105. See Sorg v. State, 688 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no pet.)(no
mental state requirement for D.W.I.); Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1983, no pet.)(no culpable mental state required in D.W.I. prosecution). A strict
liability offense is one which imposes liability without fault, i.e., no requirement of intent,
knowledge, or recklessness. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.8 (2d ed. 1986).
See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1 (Vernon Supp. 1989)(blood-alcohol content
of 0.10% or above is proof of intoxication); Comment, Minnesota Meets the Drunk Driver
Head-On, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 673, 699 (1986)(submitting to test may give proof of
violation of D.W.I. statute).
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automatically loses his right to drive.' 0 6 The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that the property interest contained within a driver's license
is substantial. 0 7 Because either the test results or the test refusal can be
admitted in a subsequent judicial proceeding,'
the choice made by the
D.W.I. suspect has a substantial effect upon the type of evidence the state
will present at trial.'0 9 Furthermore, a conviction for driving while intoxicated imposes a social stigma" 0 which affects the person's driving record
and ability to obtain employment and insurance coverage." 1 Even potentially more damaging, the intoxilyzer test results can be used against the
suspect in non-D.W.I. judicial proceedings such as a civil suit brought by the
parties involved in an automobile accident." 2 It must also be remembered
that in a traditional custodial arrest, the accused is free to go without any
further consequence should the state decide not to prosecute." 3 In the
D.W.I. context, should the state decide not to prosecute, the accused still

loses his license if he refuses the test.'

A penalty is exacted even though no

106. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1979)(upholding validity of automatic
license revocation); see also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2 (b),(f)(Vernon Supp.

1989)(refusing test invokes automatic suspension of driver's license for 90 days). For a detailed explanation of the procedures used to suspend a driver's license, see supra note 43.
107. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)(license may not be suspended without
meeting requirements of procedural due process). The Supreme Court stated that the continued possession of a driver's license may be essential to fulfilling occupational duties. Id.; see
also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)(driver's license is protectible property
interest).
108. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1989)(test refusal
or test results admissible at trial).
109. See Note, To Submit or Not to Submit-Where Is My Attorney?: The Right to Counsel Before Submission to Chemical Testing in a DWI Proceeding,63 NEB. L. REV. 373, 382

(1984)(decision to take test affects evidence presented at trial).
110. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972)(social stigma may attach to
D.W.I. conviction); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 153-54 (1959)(Black, J., dissenting)(conviction imposes public shame and humiliation).
I 1. State v. Scharf, 605 P.2d 690, 694 (Or. 1980).
112. See Crider v. Appelt, 696 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ)(evidence
of D.W.I. admissible at civil trial); Soriano v. Medina, 648 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, no writ)(D.W.I. evidence admissible at civil trial); see also TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(evidence of blood alcohol level admissible in civil or criminal proceeding); Note, To Submit or Not to Submit-Where Is My Attorney?." The Right to Counsel Before Submission to Chemical Testing in a DWI Proceeding, 63
NEB. L. REV. 373, 382-83 (1984)(conviction of D.W.I. exposes suspect to other criminal and
civil actions). However, the Texas D.W.1. statute does not permit a suspect to refuse the
breath test when, as a result of an automobile accident, someone has died or is likely to die.
See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 3(i)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(officer shall take
blood or breath sample when death occurs or is likely to result from accident).
113. Cf Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)(interrogated suspect free to leave
after completion of questioning).
114. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18 (1979)(automatic license suspension); see
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charge or conviction has been made."' Therefore, the need to preserve the
accused's known rights and safeguards compels the conclusion that D.W.I.
suspects should have the limited right to consult with counsel.' 16
If a limited right to counsel is granted, what can an attorney do when
called to aid a D.W.I. suspect? 11 7 Counsel can clarify the confusing situation which arises when the suspect is given Miranda warnings, and he requests counsel, but then is told that he has no right to an attorney at the
test.' 8 An attorney can objectively provide the full range of options open to

also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(automatic suspension of license for refusing test). In Mackey, the Supreme Court upheld the summary suspension of driver's licenses on three grounds. 443 U.S. at 18. The Supreme Court reasoned that
the statute serves as a deterrent to those who drink and drive. Also, the statute provides a
strong inducement to D.W.I. suspects to submit to the breath test so that the state will have
substantial evidence to present at trial. Finally, the statute allows for the swift removal of
drunk drivers from the road, thus, contributing to highway safety. Id. However, Justice Stewart, in his dissent, stated that the sole function of the license suspension is to penalize D.W.I
suspects for refusing the breath test. Id. at 20.
115. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(automatic

license suspension for refusing test).
116. See State v. Spencer, 750 P.2d 147, 156 (Or. 1988)(granting limited right to consult
with counsel prior to breath test); State v. Fitzsimmons, 610 P.2d 893, 898 (Wash. 1980) (en
banc) (counsel required at breath test because unique evidence obtained and trial strategy decisions which must be made), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 977 (1980). However, granting
the limited right to counsel cannot unreasonably hamper the efforts of police to remove drunk
drivers from the road. See Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646, 653 (D.S.D. 1982),
vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982)(if attorney cannot be reached within reasonable
time person must make independent decision); State v. Welch, 394 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Vt.
1978)(decision must be made within thirty minutes from first attempt to contact counsel).
117. Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)("critical stage" arises when
counsel required to prevent prejudice and protect rights of accused); see also Note, Implied
Consent Laws: Some Unsettled Constitutional Questions, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 99, 103-10
(1980)(discussing right to counsel using "critical stage" analysis).
118. See Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D.S.D.) (confusing contradiction
between Miranda warnings and implied consent statute), vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th
Cir. 1982). The court noted that several states have reversed license suspensions of defendants
who were confused by being given Miranda warnings and then told that the implied consent
statute does not permit consultation with an attorney. The problem arises when the suspect is
arrested and given Miranda warnings which inform him that he has a right to counsel. But
when he is requested to take an intoxilyzer test and asks for an attorney, he is told that he does
not have the right to counsel at that time. Id.; see also State v. Beckey, 192 N.W.2d 441, 445
(Minn. 197 l)(Miranda warnings given in conjunction with warnings required by implied-consent statute may confuse D.W.I. suspect); Latzer, The High Court vs. High Drivers. A Short
Course in Logic, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 37, 38-39 (1985)(satirical dialogue between suspect and
police illustrating D.W.I. suspect's confusion); Comment, Public Outcry v. Individual Rights:
Right To Counsel and the Drunk Driver's Dilemma, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 278, 282, n. 30
(1986)(D.W.I. suspects unable to reconcile contradiction between Miranda warnings and implied consent statute).
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the suspect and the consequences associated with each option." 9 This is a
valuable safeguard because the police officer only informs the suspect of the
consequences resulting from refusing the test.' 2° The advice of counsel
before taking the intoxilyzer test is essential because, due to the evanescent
nature of the evidence, the suspect's available options are permanently foreclosed within a matter of hours. 121 The attorney can also advise the client
on whether the refusal to take the test is reasonable. 12 2 Quite naturally, the
D.W.I. suspect is wary and suspicious of the arresting officer at a time when

119. See Comment, Minnesota Meets The Drunk DriverHead-On, 12 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 673, 698 (1986)(attorney can inform and advise suspect of ramifications of decision).
The D.W.I. suspect has the right to request an independent analysis. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 67011-5, § 3(d) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The attorney can inform the suspect of the
need to get an independent test. Id. Counsel can aid the suspect in making a rational decision
by also explaining that restricted use licenses are available which will allow the suspect to drive
to and from his place of employment. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b,
§ 23A(b)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(person convicted of D.W.I. may obtain occupational license
in order to continue employment). By providing important information and alleviating the
suspect's unnecessary fear, the suspect can make a calm and intelligent decision. See Comment, Minnesota Meets Drunk Drivers Head-On, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 673, 699
(1986)(attorney informs suspect and enables rational decisions).
120. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(officer
must inform suspect of consequences of refusing breath test). The arresting officer is required
to notify the suspect both in writing and orally that the refusal to take the test can be used in a
future prosecution, that driving privileges will be suspended, and that a hearing will be granted
if the person makes a written demand for one. Id. Thus, the arresting officer has no duty to
fully explain all of the available options open to the D.W.I. suspect. See Siegwald v. Curry,
319 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974)(police not required to inform suspect of effect on
criminal proceedings of either taking or refusing test).
121. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 3(d) (Vernon Supp. 1989)(independent blood or breath test must be taken within two hours after arrest). The failure to obtain the
independent test does not render the results of the intoxilyzer test inadmissible. Id. The attorney, if present, can request that the police preserve any pertinent evidence such as the
ampoules used in the intoxilyzer unit to capture breath samples. See Turpin v. State, 606
S.W.2d 907, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)(en banc)(police not required to preserve ampoules).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that the ampoules could be used to impeach the credibility of the test results. Id. at 917-18. However, the court's acknowledgement
only pertains to the credibility of the results; it does not warrant that police be required to
preserve the breath samples. Id. This holding does not take into account that different models
of intoxilyzer units reach different results while analyzing the same sample. See Frankvoort,
Mulder & Neuteboom, The Laboratory Testing Of Evidential Breath- Testing (EBT)Machines,
35 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 27, 42 (1987)(various intoxilyzer units achieve different results while
testing same sample).
122. See Comment, Minnesota Meets The Drunk Driver Head-On, 12 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 673, 698 (1986)(attorney is objective party who can advise when refusal unreasonable);
see also Comment, Public Outcry V Individual Rights. Right to Counsel and the Drunk
Driver's Dilemma, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 278, 294 (1986)(counsel can advise that refusal reasonable when police unreasonably request breath test).
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he is called to produce evidence which will be used against him. 2 ' The
presence of counsel can reduce this suspicion and provide the suspect with a
trusted friend who can aid him in making a knowing and intelligent decision. 124 The granting of the right to consult with counsel means that the
suspect will at least have the opportunity to talk by telephone with an attorney. 125 While it will not always be the case, an attorney can attend the actual administration of the test. 126 The value of attending the test is that the
presence of an attorney serves to impose upon the proceeding that degree of
care and respect for the suspect's rights which is essential to the proper administration of the test. 127 Therefore, the granting of a limited right to

123. See Hollander, Defending a Drunk Driver, 10 LITIGATION 25, 26 (Spring 1984)(even
brief jail experience of D.W.I. suspect is upsetting); Comment, Public Outcry v. Individual
Rights: Right to Counsel and the Drunk Driver's Dilemma, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 279, 295
(1986)(suspect may be suspicious of arresting officer); Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
448-57 (1966)(discussing coercive atmosphere of police station).
124. See Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)(en banc)(Clinton, J.,
dissenting) (attorney's advice helpful to D.W.I. suspect, quoting Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d
1206, 1312 (Alaska 1983)). State v. Fitzsimmons, 610 P.2d 893, 901 (Wash.)(en banc)(implied
consent statute does not waive suspect's right to consult attorney), vacated on other grounds,
449 U.S. 977 (1980); cf Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (198 l)(decision to waive rights
must be knowingly and intelligently made); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373
(1979)(waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing and voluntary). The analogy to the above
cited waiver cases illustrates the D.W.I. suspect's predicament of involuntarily waiving rights
which may not be fully understood without the aid of counsel. See Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707, 719 (1979)(society looks to lawyer as protector of accused's rights when dealing with
police). When the accused is compelled by the government to make an irreversible decision
concerning his legal rights, the denial of a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel is
unfair. Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646, 653 (D.S.D. 1982), vacated as moot, 682
F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).
125. See Fitzsimmons, 610 P.2d at 900 (in some cases counsel will have to advise clients
by telephone because of time limitations). Consultation by telephone will often be sufficient to
properly protect the rights of the suspect. Id.
126. See id. (adequate preparation of defense may require counsel's presence at test). A
thirty minute time period will often accommodate both the needs of the state and the D.W.I.
suspect. See Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 653 (20-30 minute period to warm-up intoxilyzer unit
provides time for suspect to consult with counsel).
127. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967)(counsel required at postindictment lineup to prevent prejudice to defendant's trial rights). Counsel is necessary at a
lineup to prevent improper suggestion which occurs in the secrecy of the police station. Id. at
229-33. In Wade, the Supreme Court reasoned that the suspect could not prevent these improprieties because "lineup participants are [not] likely to be schooled in the detection of suggestive influences. Improper influences may go undetected by a suspect, guilty or not, who
experiences the emotional tension which we might expect in one being confronted with potential accusers." Id. at 230-31. The reasoning in Wade is applicable to the intoxilyzer proceeding because D.W.I. suspects operating under the emotional tension caused by the situation
may not be able to detect improper police conduct or procedural errors. See Texas Lawyer,
Jan. 16, 1989, at 6, col. 2 (D.P.S. trooper mixed up test results of suspects and mass produced
arrest reports). An attorney familar with the intoxilyzer proceeding could ensure that the test
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counsel can play a significant role
in the preservation of the D.W.I. suspect's
28
known rights and safeguards.1
In Forte,* the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals missed the opportunity to
join the revolution in state constitutional law and, thereby, contribute to the
American concept of federalism. The test adopted by the court to determine
when the right to counsel attaches under the Texas Constitution holds that
the right to counsel does not attach until necessary to protect the safeguards
and basic trial rights of the accused. In light of the difficult choice to be
made, the consequences flowing from that choice, and the nature of the evidence obtained, substantial prejudice to the rights of the accused can occur
at the intoxilyzer proceeding. Under such circumstances, consultation with
counsel can inform the D.W.I. suspect of available options and ensure that
decisions are intelligently made. In interpreting article I, section 10 of the
Texas Constitution, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has narrowed the
right to counsel to offer only minimal protection to the accused and denied
Texans the maximum protection which history and tradition has commanded they receive.

Clifford C. Herberg, Jr.

is properly administered. See Texas Lawyer, Jan. 16, 1989, at 5, col. 2 (D.P.S. trooper ignored
policy of observing suspects for minimum of 15 minutes before administering intoxilyzer test).
The potential for mistake and abuse suggests that the administration of the test is a critical
stage requiring the presence of counsel. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37.
128. See, e.g., People v. Gursey, 239 N.E.2d 351, 353 (N.Y. 1968)(limited right to consult
with counsel prior to test in order to discuss available options); State v. Spencer, 750 P.2d 147,
155-56 (Or. 1988)(en banc)(intoxilyzer test falls within meaning of "criminal prosecutions"
provision of state constitution which require presence of counsel); State v. Welch, 376 A.2d
351, 355 (Vt. 1977)(limited right to consultation with counsel necessary to evaluate long-term
legal ramifications of test); State v. Fitzsimmons, 610 P.2d 893, 898 (Wash. 1980)(en
banc)(unique character of evidence produced by intoxilyzer test makes administration of test
critical stage), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 977 (1980).
* Editor's Note
While this issue was in the final stage of publication, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
decided McCambridge v. State, No. 297-87 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 1989) (Westlaw, Texas
Cases library). Though still subject to withdrawal, the McCambridge case rejected the "flexible standard" adopted in Forte v. State and instead adopted a "bright line rule" which states "a
critical stage does not occur until formal charges are brought against a suspect." As a result,
the reader is advised to analyze both cases.
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